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## Book Reviews

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## Book Reviews

*Karl Marx and World Literature* by S. S. Prawer. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1976. Pp. xii + 446. \$19.50.

As "orthodox" Anglo-Saxon criticism continues to run out of intellectual capital, some more ambitious, systematic and comprehensive critical method seems increasingly in demand. Of the various candidates for this role—structuralism, Marxism, semiotics, stylistics, psychoanalysis and the like—Marxism is currently enjoying rather a good press. In the United States, there is the work of men like Fredric Jameson and Stephen Morawski, as well as the increasingly potent intervention of the Marxist Literary Group; in Britain, the para-Marxist writings of Raymond Williams have influenced (if only, on occasions, by critical reaction) a growing band of younger, quasi-Althusserian aestheticians who look anxiously to Europe for a literary science which might supplant their own dismal native heritage of myopic empiricism.

In all of this, Marx's own writings on literature have a critical, if not central, importance. And there have been some valuable compendia of such work: Mikhail Lifshitz's classical compilation of Marx and Engels on literature and art, for example, or, more peripherally, Peter Demetz's deeply tendentious *Marx, Engels and the Poets*. More recently, Lee Baxandall and Stephan Morawski have provided us with a convenient, if curiously organised, record of Marx and Engels's literary comments, in the first volume of the projected DOMA series (Documents on Marxist Aesthetics). (I say "curiously organised," since—to take merely one example—Marx's famous letter to Lassalle about the latter's verse play is actually carved neatly down the middle, and the two parts assigned to different sections of the book). Of course, the development of a fully-fledged Marxist aesthetics could in no sense consist merely in a loyal reproduction of what Marx himself thought about literature—not only because his remarks were inevitably glancing and fragmentary, but because many of them fall into categories (the "sociology of literature", or "Hegelian humanism") which are themselves open to critical scrutiny. A materialist critique of Marx's own aesthetic views will surely at some point prove necessary, for Marx, as Louis Althusser has reminded us, was not always a Marxist. Nonetheless, there is an urgent need to become acquainted with the full range of what Marx wrote about literature beyond the five or six consecrated texts which every Marxist critic can quote backwards; and it is precisely this which Professor Prawer's eloquent, exhaustive and scrupulously scholarly book offers us.

It is not, self-declaredly, a work of Marxist literary theory; but neither is it a mere mechanical compendium of what Marx happened to think of Cervantes or Chateaubriand. Professor Prawer has clearly read every line Marx ever penned; but what his book precisely does not do is raid that massive *oeuvre* for the odd literary reference and then thread them perfunctorily together into a handbook of the great man's opinions. It is, rather, a work which grasps Marx's attitudes

to literature as an integral part of his thought as a whole; and in this its nearest rival is Lifshitz's *The Philosophy of Art of Karl Marx*, which similarly refuses artificially to abstract Marx's literary criticism or use of literary quotation from the complete theoretical corpus into which it is so intricately woven. But Lifshitz's book, brilliantly suggestive though it is, is quantitatively speaking a rather slim affair, whereas Prawer's densely packed four hundred pages take us step by step through the complex evolution of Marx's work, leaving not a literary stone unturned. We are taken from the young Marx's own fictional production (Romantic poetry, his unfinished comic novel and verse-tragedy) to his early experiments in journalism and his use of aesthetic concepts in the Paris writings; and from there on, in chronological sequence, we are shown how a thick layer of literary allusion is embedded in the very theoretical structure of each of Marx's important political and economic texts.

"Embedded" is perhaps the appropriate term. For Professor Prawer is not just concerned to demonstrate the breadth of Marx's literary knowledge—a breadth which, even for a highly cultivated German intellectual of his day, is truly staggering. (He read Spanish, Italian, French and Russian as well as German and English, was thoroughly familiar with ancient literature, and was equally at home with Aristophanes and English potboilers, Diderot and Defoe, Chaucer and Cervantes). All this is impressive enough; but Professor Prawer takes us beyond a simple bibliographical survey into a sensitive account of how Marx grasped the relations between literary quality and styles of political oratory, between economic and aesthetic categories, between "real" history and its ideological superstructures. It is not, then, simply a matter of what Marx read; it is a question of how he conceptualised the relations between artistic production and its historical determinants, or how he viewed the interconnections between the "aesthetic" value of a literary text and its ideological tendency.

On the last point, as Professor Prawer demonstrates, Marx's views were notably 'liberal'. Apart from his enthusiasm for the agitational ballads of the Silesian weavers, his general aversion to idyll and Romance, and his penchant for realist, satirical, "this-wordly" fiction, Marx was on the whole firmly traditional in his literary predilections. His favourite authors were Aeschylus, Shakespeare and Goethe; his aesthetic, such as it is, owes much to Schiller, Schlegel and Hegel; and he objected to literature which abstractedly exposed its tendency rather than fleshing it out in Shakespearian richness. If his materialist preoccupation with art as a form of social production anticipates the aesthetics of Brecht, Benjamin and the Futurists, his concern with art as a kind of free, self-validating labour expressing "the whole man" looks back to German idealism and forward to the aesthetics of Georg Lukács and the Marxist humanists. In short, both parties to one of the most central controversies in contemporary Marxist aesthetics—those who see art primarily in terms of material production, and those who view it as a proleptic transcendence of "alienation"—can claim Marx as an ally. It is, precisely, in the realm of literature that one of the key issues now being insistently raised within the Marxist camp—was Marx a "humanist"?—crops up in its most complex and ambiguous form.

These are not issues with which Professor Prawer is particularly concerned to engage himself; his book hovers in some indeterminate zone between empirical description and theoretical evaluation. But they are certainly questions

which stand in need of resolution, and it may well be that an examination of Marx's aesthetic views will do something to clarify them. For any such developed theoretical enquiry, Professor Prawer's richly informative study will provide an absolutely indispensable foundation.

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*The Development of English Drama in the Late Seventeenth Century* by Robert D. Hume. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976. Pp. xx + 525. \$37.50.

Robert Hume's 500-page-plus tome is an ambitious attempt to write the history ("development," he calls it) of Restoration drama (or, as he prefers, "English drama in the late seventeenth century"). His is the first such attempt since Allardyce Nicoll's *History of Restoration Drama* in 1923 (updated in 1928, 1940, and 1952/1955) and the relevant sections of James Sutherland's *English Literature of the Late Seventeenth Century*, 1969. It is commendable to have read 500 Restoration plays, as Hume says he has. Exactly how commendable depends upon the critic's ability to understand what he has read.

After the delightful send-up in the *TLS* by Anne Barton (10 Sept. 1976, pp. 1110-11) and, on this side of the Atlantic, the sober assessment by Ronald Paulson, who finds Hume's volume "querulous, rather mean-spirited" (*SEL*, 16 [1976], 521), further comment may seem superfluous. Yet it is one's duty as a reviewer to pinpoint the precise deficiencies of a book, which in Hume's case appear to be twofold: in ability to respond adequately to the language of the plays he discusses, and inability to respond to the totality of a play, in performance or as a literary text. Thus he is deaf to the superb prose dialogue in Etherege's masterpiece *The Man of Mode*, so brilliant that Dryden remarked (in 1687), "I will never enter the lists in Prose with the undoubted best Author of it w<sup>ch</sup> our nation has produc'd." Nor can Hume even discover the beautifully articulated plot of this play (pp. 86-97). Complaining of *Love for Love* that "critics read their own preoccupations into a text whose point (if any) is not unmistakably clear," he ridicules Aubrey Williams for maintaining that "the play is a demonstration of God's providence operating in the world" (p. 104). Williams had proved his point beyond question from the language, as well as other aspects, of Congreve's work (*TSL*, 17 [1972], 1-18).

It would be useless and uncharitable to repeat Hume's gibes at such outstanding critics as Dale Underwood, Norman Holland, Anne Barbeau, and Aubrey Williams. A sample of his courtesy toward his more perceptive predecessors is his summation of *The Country Wife*: "profound it is not, and only a prude, a hypocrite, or a stuffy academician would have it otherwise" (p. 104). In their place, Hume tries to promote the lightweight John Harrington Smith and—through ignorance or cruelty—John Harold Wilson, who is revered for his very special scholarship in the Backstairs and backstage but not as "a distinguished modern critic" (p. 40).

Objecting quite rightly to fuzzy omnibus categories like "comedy of manners," "comedy of humors," and "sentimental comedy," Hume nevertheless proceeds

to out-Polonius Polonius. Restoration comedy divides for him into Spanish Romance, Reform Comedy, Wit Comedy, Sex Comedy, Sentiment-Tinged Romance, City Intrigue Comedy, Augustan Intrigue Comedy, and French Farce. "Serious drama" (a fuzzy omnibus term if ever there was one) breaks down into the Heroic Play, Horror Tragedy, High Tragedy English Opera, Split Plot and Mixed Plot Tragicomedy, Pattern Tragicomedy, Pathetic Tragedy, and Parallel Plays. Numerous subcategories multiply the absurdity. Such categories are critically indefensible, and Hume is repeatedly forced to admit that they do not work for individual plays. His old-fashioned devising of generic pigeonholes is just one indication that Hume's thinking is uninfluenced by any significant critical movement since World War II.

Although Hume seems at first to subscribe to no particular school or trend in criticism, innocently propagating heresies and fallacies (in the New Critical sense) as he goes along, his sympathies are hinted on page 145 in an adulatory reference to Richard Levin (also pp. 184, 213). The allusion is a specious attempt to link up with a movement popular at MLA meetings as recently as 1975, whose catch phrase was, "Literature has no meaning!" This shibboleth, directed against something called "thematic criticism," becomes Hume's frequently iterated detestation of "profundity." As a respected scholar in his specialty, Levin would surely disown the naivete of his followers. "Thematic criticism," which his disciples mistakenly identify with the New Criticism, was debunked years ago by the New Critics themselves as "message-hunting" or "the heresy of paraphrase." This belated protest is not properly a literary phenomenon at all, but social and cultural disaffection. Hume's bias shows in his persistent sneers at the classical and Christian doctrine of Providence, not to mention his selective citation of secondary sources so as to favor the unpublished and perhaps unpublishable productions of a minority group (e.g., p. 364, n. 2).

About the only kind of comedy to which Hume makes any positive response is farce. Matching his favorite bug-word "profundity" is his tediously repeated buzz-word, "romp." His proletarian predilections reduce even good plays to farce. Thus *The Man of Mode* becomes "a piece of cream-puffery," *The Country Wife* "an immensely enjoyable play in which we take almost nothing seriously" (pp. 96, 104). He does not rise to the intellectual level of Thomas Shadwell, having already demonstrated in an article, as well as in his book, his inability to understand the normative function of Belfond Junior in *The Squire of Alsatia* (*ELN*, 6 [1969], 176-84). If Hume never deviates into Shadwell, he displays an unaccountable fondness for Edward Howard, whom—as he apparently does not know—the age derided as "Thou damn'd antipodes to common sense! Thou foil to Flecknoe!"

Hume's book affords no real insight into any of the better plays written between 1660 and 1710. Great tragedies of the period, such as Otway's *The Orphan* and *Venice Preserved*, draw a blank—although, in one of many inconsistencies that mar this volume, it finally concedes that the latter play is "happily, a tragedy which transcends such particulars" as its "anti-Whig fable" (p. 347). "To look for 'the tragic sense' in this drama," Hume concluded earlier, "is a waste of time" (p. 187).

Part I of Hume's volume is his analysis of Restoration comedy and "serious

drama"; Part II is a chronological account of Restoration plays from 1660 to 1710. If Part I proves that Hume cannot read English, Part II proves unreadable. A succession of truncated plot-summaries, it is an experience much like trying to peruse the Manhattan telephone directory from cover to cover. Nevertheless, it is an experience which all specialists in Restoration drama should occasionally undergo. Hume's memory for facts is retentive as flypaper. Hundreds of Restoration plays are sufficiently sub-literary for Hume to understand them; the masterpieces, as he claims, represent a minority. And if Hume cannot read English, at least he can count and keep dates straight. Thus, merely by minding chronology, he establishes that the prologue of Shadwell's *The Virtuoso* probably alludes to *The Man of Mode* (p. 59) and that the Young Bellair-Emilia plot in *The Man of Mode* probably borrows from the Harcourt-Alithea plot in *The Country Wife* (p. 94). More important is his recognition, on quantitative grounds, that Restoration drama reaches two separate peaks, one in the 1670s and the other in the 1690s, the earlier of which he designates "the Carolean summit 1675-1677" (p. 299). In an unpublished essay, I had already, on qualitative evidence drawn from nondramatic as well as dramatic literature, called 1676 "the apex of the 'high Restoration'" (forthcoming in *TSL*, volume for 1977). Less satisfactory are Hume's terms for these two peaks, "Carolean" (puzzling) and "Augustan" (misleading).

The "historical" air of Hume's presentation should not be allowed to give the impression that he is placing Restoration drama in some larger context. Apart from obvious events like the Popish Plot and the Exclusion Crisis, there is little sensitivity to historical developments outside the playhouse. When Hume deplors looking to Restoration drama for "profundity," that is not only because he distrusts "ideas" *per se* in drama, but because he dislikes the ideas that make up Restoration culture. Drama for him bears no relation to non-dramatic literature; he ignores such theatrically oriented poems as Rochester's *Timon* and *An Allusion to Horace* and Dryden's *MacFlecknoe*, which at one point he fails to identify (p. 359). It is not a question of the familiar, regrettable division between "theatre" and "literature," for Hume does not favor "theatre." Incredibly, he gives no direct attention to that most distinctive and theatrical of Restoration genres, the prologue and epilogue.

Hume concludes by applauding Addison's "ringing denunciation" of "poetic justice" in *Spectator* No. 40 and his alleged avoidance of "the puerilities of providential justice" in "the classical mode he championed" in *Cato* (p. 491). Hence the following passage in *Cato* is interesting:

To urge the foe to battle,  
(Prompted by blind revenge and wild despair)  
Were to refuse th' awards of Providence,  
And not to rest in heav'n's determination.

(II. ii. 63-66; also, *inter alia*, I. i. 47-53). Clearer evidence of inability to read English would be difficult to find. How can one write a history of Restoration drama without understanding the major plays?

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*Why the Lyrical Ballads? The Background, Writing, and Character of Wordsworth's 1798 Lyrical Ballads* by John E. Jordan. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976. Pp. xii + 212. \$9.75.

If there is any trend noticeable in Wordsworth scholarship of the last few years, it is away from Wordsworth's philosophical or "mystical" interests and toward a more historical and textual approach. John Jordan's *Why the Lyrical Ballads?* fits that new trend almost completely. It addresses "the whole question of how and why the *Lyrical Ballads* evolved and took the form of the first edition" (p. vii).

The approach taken is to pose a series of questions, mainly biographical and historical, and then to answer each in a separate chapter. This being the case, Professor Jordan informs us in the Introduction that the book "does not have a neat thesis," and then goes on to supply one in the form of a concept of Universality. This thesis had been better omitted, however, for the various pieces do not fit very well: the concept in fact becomes a mere tag when he hauls in the term with regard to chapter five—"his very insistence upon the novelty of the experiment proves to be common if not *universal* in his age..." (p. 3, my italics). Otherwise, the concept most often seems to refer to the universalizing element in literature, which was first dealt with in Aristotle's *Poetics*, a fact that Wordsworth himself points out in the *Preface* but which Professor Jordan neglects to mention. Instead, he links the concept with the Ineffable in Wordsworth, a point at which, as Matthew Arnold warned, most Wordsworthians arrive sooner or later, although Jordan more or less confines such treatment to this chapter.

There is surely enough cohesion afforded the study simply by the subject matter, the *Lyrical Ballads* of 1798. Chapters I and II deal with the composition and publication of the volume in a good deal of biographical detail. This part of the book is valuable but would be more so if it weren't that Mark Reed has already sketched out the biographical details in his *Wordsworth: The Chronology of the Early Years* (1967). The second chapter, in any case, makes an important contribution to the study of the problem of Wordsworth's originality, namely the division of the poems in the 1798 volume into three groups, with the determination of the third group as "the core of the 'experiment.'" Too often the whole volume has been treated as experimental.

The third chapter deals with the "Critical Environment" of the volume, but is not limited to reviews of the first edition, extending as far as reception of the *Poems in Two Volumes* (1807). This chapter is in my view the least useful in the book; generalizations are made on the scantiest evidence, and the method of running through the periodicals one by one becomes tedious, with no distinction, moreover, being made between the probable influence of the various Reviews and thus without a clear determination of their relative contribution to the "environment." And many of the poems by minor poets (such as Charlotte Smith and James Grahame) that are belittled by implication and innuendo throughout the chapter were—it should be noted somewhere—admired by Wordsworth and often quoted in his poetry.

The next two chapters, which deal with the "simplicity" and innovation of

*Lyrical Ballads*, share a common problem of seeming to ramble on without sufficient organization. The material could have been more fully digested; in Chapter IV, for instance, there is too much mere listing of contemporary use of the term "simple" and its derivatives. An important new fact, in any event, is brought out in the following chapter: the existence of similar claims to novelty in prefaces to other volumes of poetry published in 1798, an existence that indicates again the sort of literary excitement shared by writers of the time.

The question of the originality of *Lyrical Ballads* is dealt with in Chapter VI, where Jordan does to the published volumes of verse of 1798 what Robert Mayo did to the magazine verse of the 1790's in a well-known article (*PMLA*, 1954). But whereas Mayo indicates the similarities of the poems of *Lyrical Ballads* to magazine verse and relegates most of the cumulative evidence to footnotes, Jordan in the text itself gives long lists of titles of the kinds of poems popular at the time that are missing from Wordsworth's volume, such as sonnets, satires, anti-war poems, poems in heroic couplets. He concludes from this rather clumsy procedure that "Wordsworth avoided current fads of genre and treatment, and of easy topicality..." (p. 154), that he was thus in a very large way original. The problem with this argument is that even without the missing elements Jordan notes, there is still considerable variety in the volume and therefore no need to assume Wordsworth was *avoiding* anything. Jordan, furthermore, had previously argued that the *Lyrical Ballads* were indeed an experiment because "nobody protests that this sort of thing has been going on all along and they do not see what the fuss is about" (p. 109), and this argument can be turned against him here. For no reviewer noticed the avoidance of "current fads of genre and treatment." More importantly, Jordan never deals with the incompatibility of his conclusions with those of Mayo, which were supported by considerable evidence.

The final chapters are perhaps the weightiest, pointing up Wordsworth's descriptive purpose ("descriptive" in a unique sense) and the oft-discussed meaning of the title *Lyrical Ballads*. Jordan notes at the beginning of the final chapter that that meaning will probably never be fully understood but then goes a long way toward making it clearer.

A problem which is not limited to a particular chapter concerns the interpretation of the ballads Jordan places in his third group, those central to Wordsworth's experiment. In the first place, Jordan apparently considers the ballads greatly inferior to "Tintern Abbey" (p. 64), a critical position I believe seriously lacking in the understanding of Wordsworth's greatness. However that may be, I find a number of his interpretations questionable: "Simon Lee" is said to be written "on the familiar *sic transit* theme" (p. 154) and not on the paradoxical insight stated at the end of the poem; "Anecdote for Fathers" was intended to reveal character (p. 165) and not (as the motto suggests) to reveal a psychological insight; and, according to Jordan, the absence of gravestones in "The Brothers" indicates how "unsung, humble, simple" were the folk in the ballads (pp. 141-142), rather than the existence of a community of natural piety which didn't *need* such tangible reminders of the dead (lines 178-183).

None of these misreadings, however important otherwise, seriously affects the value of the study Professor Jordan has produced. There are a number of very



useful points raised in the book and some issues settled. It is an ambitious book despite a seemingly narrow focus, and if one is not totally satisfied in the end, it is perhaps because one's expectations were raised so high in the beginning.

A final word. The battle lines in defense of English prose have withdrawn so far, I feel a certain duty to remark on the writing contained in this scholarly book. Verbose constructions, such as "It is interesting to note that..." occur with deadening regularity. There are also a goodly number of awkward constructions, especially where titles are used as adjectives: "Part of this was written in the *Lyrical Ballads* context, and *Peter Bell* may well have begun as in some ways a 'things of every day' analogue to 'Ancient Mariner'" (p 11). But the most disturbing sort of error in a book of this kind is the large number of typographical errors; I found no fewer than *seventeen*, many of them within quotations—and I wasn't looking for them. There is some question whether the book was edited by the Press or proofread by the author.

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*Whitman's Journey into Chaos: A Psychoanalytic Study of the Poetic Process* by Stephen A. Black. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975. Pp. xv + 255. \$13.50.

Stephen A. Black's conceit of Whitman's major poems as journeys into the chaos of his unconscious is derived with suitable acknowledgement but significant modifications from Edwin H. Miller's *Walt Whitman's Poetry: A Psychological Journey* (1968). Unlike Miller and previous psychological commentators, Black proposes that these poems are not records of external events, but rather that the poems are themselves the events. And one of Black's chief concerns is to elicit from both biographical and literary data what he terms "the patterns" of Whitman's unconscious. These he in turn employs to chart Whitman's major achievements—from 1855 (the year of the first edition of *Leaves of Grass*) to 1865 ("When Lilacs Last in the Dooryard Bloom'd").

The work is divided into three parts ("In Search of Whitman," "*Leaves of Grass*, 1855, 1856," and "The Third *Leaves of Grass* and After"), each of which incorporates a section entitled "A Biography of an Imagination"—and it is in these that Black is at his most typical and persuasive. In the first section he explores some of the poet's early and largely neglected fiction to discern what he terms an underlying, unconscious "pattern" of Whitman as father to his younger brothers and sisters and a partner to his mother. From fiction Black moves to fact and shows how Whitman sustained this "pattern" later in life by playing the role of a father to a series of young men.<sup>1</sup> Black

<sup>1</sup> It is rather disconcerting to see Herbert Gilchrist, a highly accomplished portrait painter, lumped with Peter Doyle and Harry Stafford as a "semiliterate working-class" man (p. 31).

also puts this "pattern" to excellent use by presenting the only persuasive reading I have as yet encountered of Whitman's notorious letter to John Addington Symonds claiming paternity of six children.

The "pattern" also served a function in Whitman's poetic process, which Black sees as a movement between an internal and external world, each of which presented dangers to the poet: to remain too long in the internal was to run the risk of madness; to remain too long in the external was to be utterly dependent on chance. To safeguard against these risks Whitman provided himself with an ideal reader—modelled on an introjected imago of his mother—with whom he enjoyed relations analogous to those in his pattern as "patriarch."

After presenting his theoretical framework, Black attempts to analyze four poems ("Clef Poem," "As I Ebb'd with the Ocean of Life," "There Was a Child Went Forth" and "Out of the Cradle Endlessly Rocking") using as his point of departure two key insights: 1) "the poet characteristically tried to avoid anxiety resulting from his conflicts by seeking psychological catharsis, an ecstatic feeling that gave him the illusion that conflicts had been resolved" (p. 46) and (2) "For Whitman, writing a poem sometimes had an effect similar to talking to an analyst" (p. 48). It is in these readings that we first encounter one of the chief problems with Black's book. Although it is informative to be presented with interpretations based on the dynamics of Whitman's unconscious, it is difficult to avoid the impression that Black tends to be procrustean. Black supports his thesis, but Whitman's poems point to much more.

In the second section, Black's reading of "Song of Myself" is provocative. Rather than attempting as most critics do to fit the work into some philosophic system, Black approaches it as a development of three motifs: 1) Whitman's identifications, 2) his cathartic episodes, 3) his notion of the role of the democratic bard. Black's exploration of the second motif is especially persuasive. Believing that the poem's "coherence rests in psychologic rather than intellectual logic" (P. 89), he traces the poem as a series of regressions into cathartic sensuality. His reading of section eleven is both novel and convincing: the episode of the lady with the twenty-eight bathers is a "fantasy about a fantasy" (p. 105).

In the concluding section Black collects evidence to support the notion that Whitman may well have been essentially auto-erotic rather than heterosexual or homosexual. Assuming this to be the case, Black points out how some of the problems in reading the "Calamus" and "Enfans d'Adam" sections are resolved if the poems are read as springing from autoerotic fantasies rather than sexual affairs. But unfortunately Black carries his argument too far and engages in some implausible readings. The following examples illustrate some of his extremes. In commenting on one of Whitman's journal entries, Black speculates:

"It is IMPERATIVE, that I obviate & remove myself (& my orbit) at all hazards from this *incessant enormous* & PERTURBATION." (Unless my ear deceives me, there is a "Freudian" slip in this elliptical sentence, a noun having been omitted following "*enormous*." As it stands, the phrase "& PERTURBATION" seems to be in the place where Whitman may have intended to specify the alternative to remaining "perturbed"; however, the way the sentence was actually

written suggests that a word that sounds like "PERTURBATION"—namely, "masturbation"—was in the back of Whitman's mind. All of this tends to confirm what I have hypothesized about the implications of Whitman's autoeroticism.) (pp. 195-96).

And in a discussion of the first of the "Calamus" poems, Black offers this explication of the following line: "Resolved to sing no songs to-day but those of manly attachment." Black writes: "He regards his poem as seminal essences that do 'not exhibit' themselves yet contain 'all the rest' that he projects through that 'manly attachment,' the penis, in order to bequeath 'types of athletic love'" (p. 200).

Although Black avoids most of the customary crudities of psychological approaches to literature, his work does not cohere. The sections on the "Biography of an Imagination" are stimulating and persuasive, and if read seriatim may well be seen as an independent work. His consideration of the poems, on the other hand, while supplying occasional insights, often seems sporadic and, at times, forced. It is as if some necessary stage between the theory of the poetic process and the application of this theory to interpretation had been omitted.

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*Hemingway's First War: The Making of "A Farewell to Arms"* by Michael Reynolds. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976. Pp. ix + 309 pp. \$13.50.

*Hemingway's First War* is an original and valuable book which uses unpublished letters and manuscripts, source reading, historical background and literary biography to illuminate *A Farewell to Arms*. Since virtually all the significant works in the modern period have been thoroughly analyzed and interpretive literary criticism has almost come to a dead end—apart from the rare brilliant article, most explications are either far-fetched or familiar—the textual, comparative, inter-disciplinary, historical and biographical approaches, which bring new learning to bear on literary works, are now the most useful and innovative ways to discuss modern literature.

Reynolds proves, with the help of detailed maps and interesting photographs, as well as a clear prose style, that in *A Farewell to Arms*, the only novel set on terrain with which Hemingway did not have personal experience, he used military histories and newspaper accounts to provide the factual basis of the Austro-Italian campaigns that took place when the novelist was still in high school in Oak Park. One Italian critic, who believed that Hemingway must have taken part in those battles, wrote: "this actually was the climate of Italy between the summer of 1915 and the autumn of 1917. The picture painted by Hemingway is exact. One who wishes to know what the defeat was like in the minds of officers and soldiers of the Second Army after Caporetto can read *A Farewell to Arms*." In fact, the account of the disastrous defeat in

October 1917, when the Austrians, with the help of German troops released from the Russian front after the Revolution, launched the attack on Caporetto, broke the Italian line and hurled it back to the Piave, was so realistic and painful that Mussolini's government banned the novel, which was not published in Italy until after World War Two.

Hemingway's acknowledged master in the technique of verisimilitude was Stephen Crane, who wrote *The Red Badge of Courage* before he had seen any war but, as Hemingway observed in his Introduction to *Men at War*: "he had read contemporary accounts, had heard the old soldiers, they were not so old then, talk, and above all he had seen Matthew Brady's wonderful photographs"—which provided a great many vivid and morbid details and stimulated his visual imagination. Hemingway's wide reading was originally inspired by his natural desire to understand the war and his own (later) experience there; and the historical sources gave him a total knowledge much greater than any combatant could possibly have. Frederic Henry's military failure "is the epitome of the general performance of the Italian Second Army during the retreat," and the novel accurately reflects the causes of the defeat: the Socialist revolt in Turin, the severe shortage of food, the effective enemy propaganda and the poor Italian leadership.

Hemingway's main sources: G. Ward Price's "The Italians at Bay," published in the *Century Magazine* in 1917, Hugh Dalton's *With British Guns in Italy* (1919), the autobiographical essays by Percival Gibbon and G. M. Trevelyan in the five-volume *The Great Events of the Great War* (1920), Charles Bakewell's *The Story of the American Red Cross in Italy* (1920), Douglas Johnson's *Battle Fields of the World War* (1921) and, for topographical details, Baedeker's *Northern Italy* (1913), were journalistic or first-hand accounts of the war rather than scholarly histories, but they gave him precisely what he needed and provide us with fascinating insights into his creative imagination. Reynolds convincingly argues that the precision of Hemingway's details should put to rest any arguments that he used his personal experience in the Greek retreat from Turkey in 1922 as the basis of his fiction.

Reynolds did not, apparently, go to Italy to inspect the terrain (as Hemingway later did) and to confirm his insights with first-hand observation rather than with a guide book. If the critic had had personal experience in Italy he would have been less impressed by Hemingway's "expertise" about the selection of the "best cafés" (which are obvious by their location on the main streets and their grand exteriors), about the "curious [fact] that Frederic would buy chocolate at a cafe-restaurant" (for all good Italian cafés sell *dolci*), and about which hotel will "allow them to register without luggage and will not question their relationship" (all but small family hotels and the most expensive establishments would permit this, and many hotels would and still do rent rooms by the hour).

Reynolds has also found out much more about the distinguished centenarian and diplomat, Count Giuseppe Greppi, a contemporary of Metternich and prototype of Count Greffi, whom Hemingway met in Stresa in 1918. More significantly, he has discovered in personal interviews and in the Archives of the American Red Cross, a great deal of new information about the principal model for Catherine Barkley, Agnes von Kurowsky, who perfectly fulfilled

"the myth of the war nurse, the dream of beauty that all men take to war with them." When the nineteen-year-old Hemingway met Agnes at the Red Cross Ospedale Maggiore in Milan in 1918 she was twenty-six years old, 5' 8" tall, weighed 133 pounds and had a "well developed" chest measurement of 35". She had an ideal personality for a nurse and was not romantically interested in Hemingway, though he, inevitably, fell deeply in love with her. There actually was a wardrobe full of empty cognac bottles, and an older nurse recalls Hemingway as "young (about 20), impulsive, very rude, 'smarty,' and uncooperative. He always gave the impression of having been badly spoiled." But Agnes, who maintains "I don't think I was ever crazy about him. He was a very attractive person. He had wit and you could enjoy his company," also claims "Hemingway and I were very innocent at that time—very innocent—both of us."

In 1919, while still corresponding with Hemingway, Agnes became engaged to Domenico Caracciolo, a *tenente* in the army and heir to an Italian dukedom, who was very different from the brash young "smarty": "He was very gentle, a gentle, nice soul—much more interesting to me than a nineteen-year-old." But when his aristocratic family opposed the marriage, despite Agnes' "von," she returned to New York. She later served with the Red Cross in Rumania and Haiti, had a brief and unsuccessful marriage, retired to Key West, but never saw Hemingway again.

It is rather surprising, after Reynolds' long and interesting chapter on Agnes, that he seriously underestimates her profound influence on Hemingway and concludes that she "contributes little to Catherine Barkley other than her presence and her physical beauty.... It must be obvious that [the relationship of Agnes and Hemingway] could never have been that of Catherine and Frederic." It could certainly be argued, on the contrary, that apart from his mother, the most influential woman in Hemingway's life was Agnes von Kurovsky, who first taught him, when he was defenceless and vulnerable, to accept the care and protection of a woman. Harry's recollections in "The Snows of Kilimanjaro"—which concern Agnes, *not* his first wife Hadley, whom he could and did "cure himself of loving"—suggest that Hemingway was devastated by Agnes' rejection; and the trauma of her betrayal, for that is how he interpreted it, forced him into instinctive self-protection. He then guarded himself against betrayal and loneliness by conducting a liaison with a future wife during his current marriage; and when he had ensured his own emotional stability, abandoned his wife before she could leave him.

In *A Farewell to Arms* Agnes-Catherine is revealed and reflected in the man she loves. Hemingway idealizes Catherine, and emphasizes her fine background and flawless physical attributes as well as her rather military virtues of loyalty and self-sacrifice. The beauty and submissiveness of the romantic and tragic heroine heightens the stoic virility of the wounded hero, and makes her a suitable object for his attention and pleasure. But their relationship, however charming, is one-dimensional and *dommée*, and they attempt to communicate in rhetorical banalities and platitudes:

"Oh, darling, I love you so."

"Don't we have a fine time?..."

"Do I make a good wife?"

"You're a lovely wife."

Reynolds' scholarship is superior to his criticism, for he writes that Hemingway's "insights are imbedded in the novel like polished gems" and assumes rather than argues the greatness of the novel.

Hemingway's imaginative portrayal of Frederic and Catherine is based on his *emotional* not factual relationship with Agnes. The essence of Catherine's tragedy is her unwanted baby, and for this aspect of the novel Hemingway transposes on to Agnes his resentment against the accidental pregnancy of Hadley, who, like Agnes, was seven years older than Hemingway. Reynolds' statement that Frederic is "self-centered" and "it is Catherine who makes the sacrifices" is too kind to Frederic and too superficial about the complexity of Hemingway's feelings. For Catherine expresses the guilt and the insecurity of a woman who is purely a sexual object and does not want to "make trouble":

"You aren't angry are you, darling?"

"No."

"And you don't feel trapped?"

"Maybe a little. But not by you..."

"She won't come between us, will she? The little brat..."

I was afraid because I'm big now that maybe I was a bore to you..."

I know I'm no fun for you, darling. I'm like a big flour barrel."

The magnanimous Hemingway ("Maybe a little. But not by you.") also transforms his private accident, and his lack of responsibility and loyalty, into a kind of malign retribution for romantic love: "That was the price you [i. e., *he*] paid for sleeping together. That was the end of the trap. That was what people got for loving each other." In the novel, Hemingway continues the hunting metaphor of the trap and compares the newborn baby to a freshly skinned rabbit in order to dissociate himself from the realities of paternity. Frederic (who like Hemingway had a son instead of the expected daughter) confesses, "I had no feeling for him. He did not seem to have anything to do with me. I had no feeling of fatherhood." And Catherine has a series of uncontrollable hemorrhages that lead to her death. Though Catherine "leaves" Frederic, her death represents Hemingway's rejection and desertion of Hadley and his first son, John.

Reynolds' discussion of the historical and biographical background is by far the strongest part of the book; and it is not at all clear why he begins with the writing and publication of the novel in 1928-30 (Section One) rather than with Hemingway's experiences in 1918-28 (Section Two). If he had followed chronology, his analysis of the novel (Section Three) would have come logically after the publication of the book. Despite this unnecessary confusion, Reynolds' extensive treatment of the revisions in the manuscript (now in the John F. Kennedy Library in Washington) and use of unpublished letters (their location is not cited nor are they quoted directly), shows that Hemingway was a good self-critic and nearly always improved his early drafts. The appendices list thirty-two variant endings of the novel, which clearly gave Hemingway

the most trouble, and thirty-four titles, mainly from the Bible and the *Oxford Book of English Verse*.

Reynolds' account of the book's publication reveals that Hemingway was forced to submit to Scribner's censorship of his numerous obscene words; and that Fitzgerald made some excellent suggestions which Hemingway's dignity and self-esteem did not allow him to accept. When Fitzgerald concluded: "A beautiful book," Hemingway, fearful of being patronized, tersely noted: "Kiss my ass." He received \$16,000 for the serial rights of the enormously successful novel, which he wrote in less than six months while moving from Paris through Key West, Kansas City, and Piggot, Arkansas to Sheridan, Wyoming. The first printing of 31,000 copies in September 1929 had doubled by January; and the book had sold 1,400,000 copies by 1961.

Though Reynolds has some interesting things to say about the structure of the novel (each book has its own action and season), about the techniques of foreshadowing and role-reversal, and the theme of isolation, his analysis is rather dry and lacks rigorous evaluation and critical judgment. But he does suggest that Hemingway placed his hero in the retreat from Caporetto rather than in the redemptive and triumphant battle of Vittorio Veneto, which occurred exactly one year later and led to the surrender of Austria, in order to portray Frederic Henry in the midst of a defeated army and have him represent (like the autobiographical heroes of *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* and *Goodbye to All That*) the disillusioned idealism of the postwar period.

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*Thought, Words and Creativity: Art and Thought in Lawrence* by F. R. Leavis.

New York: Oxford University Press, 1976. Pp. 156. \$10.00.

In the early 1950's, at a time when D. H. Lawrence's work had fallen into severe critical neglect, F. R. Leavis published an important series of articles dealing with works like *The Rainbow*, *Women in Love*, "The Captain's Doll," and *St. Mawr*. Leavis treated Lawrence more seriously, at greater length, and with a deeper and more sympathetic understanding than anyone had before. In 1955 Leavis gathered his essays from *Scrutiny*, revised and supplemented by new material, to form his enormously influential book-length study *D. H. Lawrence: Novelist*. In the introduction to that volume, Leavis declared his polemical aim to be "to win clear recognition for the nature of Lawrence's greatness." In fact, all of Leavis's writings on Lawrence, covering nearly half a century from 1930 to 1976, have been motivated by the same double purpose: first, the critical work of exploring the nature and meaning of Lawrence's writings, and second, the missionary work of convincing an unappreciative world of the supreme value of Lawrence's genius. Leavis has had considerable success in fulfilling both intentions. It is a critical commonplace that Leavis was the presiding spirit and most important moving force behind the so-called "Lawrence Revival" of the

mid-fifties, which has led to the publication of hundreds of books, articles, and Ph. D. dissertations on Lawrence, and has made him one of the pre-eminent English novelists of our century. (Yet it is not often enough remembered that Harry T. Moore published *The Life and Works of D. H. Lawrence* in 1951 and *The Intelligent Heart* in 1954, or that Mark Spilka published his *The Love Ethic of D. H. Lawrence* in 1955. Leavis's voice was neither so lonely, nor crying in quite so bleak a wilderness, as his own polemics presume.)

A new book by Leavis on Lawrence, then, some two decades after the ground-breaking first book, might well have been an extraordinary event. I, for example, welcomed *Thought, Words and Creativity* with enthusiasm and high expectations. Here would be, I hoped, the provocative afterthoughts, the final corrections and extensions of understanding, the serenely authoritative wisdom that accrues to a powerful mind which has contemplated a subject for fifty years. But judged by these expectations, *Thought, Words and Creativity* is a very great disappointment. Leavis offers few new insights or even fresh ideas, demonstrates a remarkable lack of awareness of the other work on Lawrence which has been done since 1955, seems totally ignorant of modern cultural plurality (which has promoted both unspeakable vulgarity and philistinism, and deeply assimilated appreciation for Lawrencean values), and most sadly of all, rehearses all the old grievances against T. S. Eliot, which had provided Leavis with the polemical impetus of his earlier book. Indeed, *Thought, Words and Creativity* has so little of value to readers interested in Lawrence, as opposed to those interested in Leavis, that one is forced to conclude that Oxford has published it as an act of homage to Leavis's past greatness.

Leavis takes as his departure point T. S. Eliot's judgment, made in the thirties, that Lawrence was "incapable of what is ordinarily called thinking." The opening chapter seeks to demonstrate not only that Eliot's judgment was obtuse, but that Eliot's obtuseness is representative of our entire civilization, which "breeds blankness to the wonder and significance" of human creativity. Lamentably, much of this long first chapter is given over to polemics against Eliot, as though assaulting Eliot's own capacity "to think" and undermining Eliot's importance as a critic somehow establishes the capacity and importance of Lawrence. Even though most readers will find the Leavis-contra-Eliot polemics redundant and irrelevant, the polemics might have redeemed themselves if they had at least been first-rate. But the truth is that Leavis here rarely makes a point clearly and thoroughly. His argument consists mainly of bold and unsupported assertion and question-begging. For instance, Leavis dismisses "Eliot's magnum opus, *Four Quartets*," with the observation that although the work "is devoted to sustained exploratory thought, the thought frustrates itself by reason of the contradiction at its heart." What that contradiction is, how it invalidates the work as "thought," and why Eliot is therefore typical of "our all-conquering civilization" which "has killed the very idea of creativity," are all left unspecified, to be taken on faith.

The rest of the book, chapter-length discussions of *The Plumed Serpent*, *Women in Love*, "The Captain's Doll," and *The Rainbow*, strives toward depiction of Lawrence's particularly valuable kind of "thought." Of these chapters, that dealing with *The Plumed Serpent* holds the greatest potential interest, since Leavis has previously said little about that novel. But Leavis bogs



down in polemics against early reviewers of the novel, against Austin Harrison (who succeeded Ford Madox Ford as editor of the *English Review*), and against the journal *The Calendar of Modern Letters*. The result is that Leavis, lost in the fight, ultimately makes very few interesting observations about *The Plumed Serpent*.

The remaining chapters do not become so embroiled in Leavis's private quarrels. Moreover, they unquestionably contain an abundance of deeply felt, keenly intelligent, critical commentary. Yet these chapters, however much passion and thought have gone into their making, fail altogether to justify themselves for the reader and critic of Lawrence. In simple truth, Leavis's book fails to engage new and valuable concepts or interpretations, because it emerges from a uniquely insular mind. *Thought, Words and Creativity* exists in a social and critical vacuum, with no real implied audience, no discernable awareness that others have thought and communicated usefully about Leavis's concerns, with, in a word, no extra-personal purpose. More than an act of communication, *Thought, Words and Creativity* is the private journal of a very withdrawn man, ruminating over and often reiterating his past opinions, achievements, and intellectual wars.

CHARLES ROSSMAN

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*Theory of Criticism: A Tradition and its System.* By Murray Krieger. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976. Pp. xiv + 250. \$12.95.

This is an important critical work, one which challenges us to hold fast to the humanizing value of literature; at the same time it is somewhat disquieting, since the terms of the challenge seem to entail our rejection of a great deal of the critical theory of the last fifteen years. *Theory of Criticism* is actually three books in one: a mature introduction to the problems of theory, a history of humanist theory, and the extension and comprehension of these two into a statement of Krieger's own humanist position within the world of contemporary theory. The parts of the book are, accordingly, "The Limits and Capacities of Critical Theory," "The Humanistic Theoretical Tradition," and "A Systematic Extension."

In the first part of *Theory of Criticism* Krieger is concerned with the following questions: aesthetic experience and how it may be distinguished from other kinds of experience; artistic production; the socializing effects of art; and the activity of the critic in experiencing the poem and formalizing his response to it. Concern with form-making reveals Krieger's fundamental alliance with the New Criticism; yet *Theory of Criticism* represents a contemporary stage of that set of concerns. The appearance of such problems as the poet's struggle with language and the ontological status of the poem produces echoes of Ransome and others, but Krieger's way of handling the problems does not. The list of questions given above centers around the activity of the perceiver, who as reader and/or critic constructs his own experience. Even

the making activity of the poet is treated by Krieger as an inference from the prior experience by the reader of a unified aesthetic object.

Krieger's attempt to see much of critical history as a specifically "humanistic theoretical tradition" (Part II) contains, despite its scope, a number of excellent analyses. The critical problems of that tradition emerge from the opposition of mimetic and expressive theories, and the opposition unfolded from this between nature and artifice, fact and fiction. Krieger is excellent on his two favorite theoreticians, Aristotle and Coleridge. He is astute in his perception of Aristotle as belonging to the humanistic tradition—because the philosopher emphasizes the form-making capacity of human beings; yet he in part misses Aristotle the scientist, who notes the "making" capacity of humans as the subject of only one of several sciences which constitute knowledge. The humanist position actually stems from the Sophists, one of whom argued that "Man is the measure of all things; of things that are, that they are; of things that are not, that they are not."

As he sees a conflict of the mimetic with form-making in Aristotle, so in Coleridge Krieger sees the conflict between the Neoplatonic—the celebration of the creativity of consciousness—and the Aristotelian—in this case the form-making capacity. And here it seems that Krieger's—and the contemporary world's—tendency to see the poem as a verbal object works against a clear understanding of Coleridge. In the *Biographia Literaria* the focus is consciousness: the act of the primary Imagination is the fundamental vital act which creates the consciousness and its perceptions. This process is an *imitation* of the eternal creative act, the I AM which creates all existence. The act of the secondary Imagination is the imitation of both prior processes. All three processes are at the same time creative or form-making processes which are purely subjective, since the products exist in the minds of the creators.

Except for these few places where it raises problems, Krieger's analysis is precise and well developed. The structure of his discourse allows him to focus on the crises of critical history, the mimetic-expressive one in the Renaissance, the sceptic challenge to rationalism in the eighteenth century and the answer to it in the "pure subjectivities" of Kant and Coleridge, and finally the Structuralist challenge to the New Criticism.

The third part of the book is the most interesting, since here Krieger faces the challenge of Structuralism and Post-Structuralism. He perceives a fundamental opposition between these and his own humanist-New Critical position—an opposition primary of value. According to Krieger, Structuralism and its offspring deconstruct and devalue literature: Structuralist method "demythifies in that it cleanses its object of study of all content"; the structuralists effect "their emptying of language, their unsubstantializing it. Literary texts become depersonalized, unauthored *écritures*; they lose their value as unique, privileged presences."

But is this the crisis of post-modernist aesthetics? Is there a crisis at all of anti-human proportions? There are in fact some grounds for seeing the New Criticism and Structuralism simply as methodological alternatives and the loss of content as inherent in the methodological choice. As Krieger makes clear, New Criticism is primarily concerned with form and form-making. The tendency in New Criticism is to emphasize the verbal/actional structure—the text—as the

form given to human values (the content); the analysis reveals the hierarchical, unified structure of elements (thematics) as the intentional means by which the artist insures the communication of values. The Author is the god-like individual who acts through art to maintain or change cultural values.

There are two kinds of literary structuralism. The Barthesian version (most notably in *S/Z*) centers on the "semantic substance" (the same "content," in a sense) but by means of a method very different from that of the New Critics anatomizes the content into elements which belong to various codes—cultural, proairetic, symbolic, and so on. This is the atomist's view of the text, a loose collection of discontinuous elements, substructures, and (sometimes) larger structures. There is "play" in the text, reversibility among the coded elements, plurality—and no unity, hierarchy, design. There is no Author; at most he is a "public scribe"; the reader/critic plunges into the crevices opened by the excessive play, reads, re-reads, re-writes; he experiences the plurality of the text. This last, of course, illustrates the same movement as in Krieger's criticism toward emphasis on the making or processing activity of the reader.

There is another methodologically different version of Structuralism whose most prominent exponent is Roman Jakobson. For Jakobson the statement made is the text (i. e., any instance of the communicative process), yet the statement has no content. The words are the matter—not the *subject* matter—and the forms are the structures which underlie and constitute the verbal topology. Jakobson devises six structures which function in the communicative process, but they are abstract structures rather than the discontinuous ones of Barthes. Jakobson can thus treat the poetic function separately as a potential of any verbal text yet maintain that there is a discreet class of verbal objects in which this structure is dominant.

In Post-Structuralism Krieger is most interested in Derrida, de Man, and Riddel. Derrida is central to Krieger, since he represents the most extreme of the de-presencing and de-centering tendencies of contemporary thought. It is Derrida who has perceived the vulnerability of the terms "communication" and "content" and has begun to ask the most vigorous questions about presence or value in language. In "Différence" he takes the sceptical position, accepting unequivocally only the literal existence of language, the marks on the page. If language is thought to have a content then Derrida can speak of it as deferring that presence temporally—forever, in fact; if it is thought of as constituted by differential structures—spatially different—then Derrida can argue that the "elements of signification function not by virtue of the compact force at their cores but by the network of oppositions that distinguish them and relate them to one another." Sic transit content. In the last part of this passage Derrida is pressing structuralism to reveal its methodological assumptions about contentlessness. Derrida and Krieger are roommates if not bedfellows, though they turn in opposite directions. Derrida is arguing that the traditional Western assumptions about the content or substance expressed by language are false; Krieger laments that no one believes in those assumptions any more, even as enabling fictions.

In the face of this neo-Visigoth demystification of language, Murray Krieger opposes his humanism, his defense of the privilege and value of literature; on the other hand he is wise enough to be sceptical—both for himself and his

audience. He insisted on the "presence" of the poem, but he is willing to treat the presence as both "miracle and deception" or "miracle-as-deception."

To maintain this balance of seriousness and absurdity, Krieger draws on E. H. Gombrich, Rosalie Colie, Sigurd Burckhardt, and, strangely enough, Derrida. The former teach him to take the "phenomenological position"—i. e., as perceiver. This is the stance developed in Part I. He speaks of the critic as "relating himself only to his phenomenological construct of the poem as his intentional aesthetic object." What Krieger chooses to defend here is the creation by the reader/critic of the "miraculous presence," the "nowness" of synchronicity in the face of the actual diachronic process of reading poems. Krieger even turns Derrida's dialectic to his account, for absence implies presence; if Derrida argues against "verbal presence in writing generally" this justifies the "argument for presence in poetry-as-fiction."

*Theory of Criticism* is in short a strong defense of humanist values in literary theory and a clear delineation of the continuity of this tradition. Yet by setting himself in opposition to many of the post-New Critical developments in theory, Krieger does in effect (if not in intent) close us off to one of the most explosive and exciting eras in the history of criticism. Most of these developments center around Structuralism, and to a lesser degree, the phenomenological tradition. The new theories certainly de-value, depersonalize, and even at times de-anthropomorphize literature; these same theories often kill off the Romantic Author-Hero; they dispense with value in the humanist sense; yet certainly in these same theories we have begun to treat literature systematically, even scientifically, in terms of its relation to language, culture and history. Hardly a new ice age of anti-human values.

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*The Major Film Theories: An Introduction* by J. Dudley Andrew. New York: Oxford University Press, 1976. Pp. x + 278. Illus. \$3.95.

In *The Major Film Theories* J. Dudley Andrew seeks "to set off the major theorists one against the other, forcing them to speak to common issues, making them reveal the basis of their thought" (p. v). To achieve that end he examines writers whom he places in three categories: the Formative Tradition—Hugo Münsterberg, Rudolf Arnheim, Sergei M. Eisenstein, Béla Balázs; Realist Film Theory—Siegfried Kracauer, André Bazin; and Contemporary French Criticism—Jean Mitry, Christian Metz, Amédée Ayfre, Henri Agel. The common issues he offers as a means of relating the theorists include "raw material"—the nature of the medium; "methods and techniques"—technology; "forms and shapes"—genre, relation to the other arts; "purpose and value"—cinema's place in our lives. One is glad to have another work to add to the surprisingly small number of studies devoted exclusively to film theory.

Among its strong points, the book offers a superb discussion of André Bazin, with valuable commentary on the French writer's theory of cinematic space and depth of field, as well as on the man himself. In addition, Andrews provides a

balanced introduction to current French theory, and considers Jean Mitry in a helpful manner by viewing him as a major synthesizer of the opposing formative and realist traditions. The shorter discussions of Ayfre and Agel whose works, like Mitry's, have not appeared significantly in translation, are needed introductions. Particularly welcome is Andrews' sympathetic and objective treatment of Christian Metz who often fares severely at the pens of American theorists and critics.

Even with these most attractive features, though, the book may evoke less positive responses for a number of reasons. To begin, one wishes there were more specific examples provided from the films to illustrate the points Andrews and the critics make. Since he refers so gracefully and efficaciously to fine examples (a case in point, Carl Dreyer's *Day of Wrath*, p. 203), why not add some? Although the explanations of message/code, and system/text in the Metz section are informative, there could be greater precision in the comments on syntagm/paradigm, signifier/signified, and the double articulation. I don't believe Metz would agree that "we are hardpressed" to separate denotation and connotation (p. 222), since, following a model of Roland Barthes, Metz offers examples of how we can do this. In addition, since the "Grande Syntagmatique" constitutes such a major portion of *Film Language*, why does it receive such cursory treatment here?

In works of this nature, it would be impossible to offer a selection of theorists satisfactory to all readers; one sympathizes with Andrews and the kinds of objections to which he is automatically subject. But even granting that he can not please all of his audience, some may find that the rationale for the theorists chosen begs the question: he picked "those thinkers who best articulate a position which has behind it either extensive thought or an important tradition" (p. vi). Peter Wollen appears only in the bibliography; surely a theorist of this stature and impact deserves more consideration than this. Lev Kuleshov receives only two brief mentions.

While it would be unfair to criticize Andrews for only mentioning Vachel Lindsay, it would have been desirable to inform readers that his *The Art of the Moving Picture* appeared before Hugo Münsterberg's *The Film: A Psychological Study*, in 1915 and not, as listed in the bibliography, 1916; also, Münsterberg refers approvingly to Lindsay in his later work. Such information would thus qualify the assertion that Münsterberg "wrote without precedent, and . . . his is not only the first but also the most direct film theory" (p. 14). It is inaccurate to say that Münsterberg "never discussed the director or script-writer as a creative force" (p. 16). One finds Münsterberg speaking of the cooperation needed between the two, while he notes that the script "becomes a complete work of art only through the action of the producer [his term for the director]," and argues the following point: "the producer of the photoplay really must show himself a creative artist, inasmuch as he is the one who actually transforms the plays into pictures. . . . In the photoplay the whole emphasis lies on the picture and its composition is left entirely to the producing artist," (Münsterberg, *The Film* [1916; rpt. New York: Dover, 1970], p. 83).

Various mechanical errors should be corrected in later printings. There is a discrepancy between sections, chapters and corresponding notes at the end of the book: the notes for chapters 8, 9 and 10 should be for chapters 7, 8 and 9;

part III was erroneously given notes as chapter 7. The word "entymologist" (p. 186) should be "entomologist." Printing errors include a misspelling of "cluttered" (p. 42); and mistakes or omissions in the index (Pudovkin and Sarris) and bibliography (volume numbers for *Film Comment* and *Film Quarterly*).

ROBERT T. EBERWEIN

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*The Game of the Impossible: A Rhetoric of Fantasy* by W. R. Irwin. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1976. Pp. xii + 215. \$9.95.

This study argues that fantasy as a genre stands opposed to the fantastic on the one hand and to the romance on the other by a particular combination of internal material and style: nonfact must be made to appear factual, and to this end the style must cooperate by presenting its nonfacts coherently and with a straight face. With fantasy, both writer and reader engage in a "conspiracy of intellectual subversiveness... a game," Irwin suggests. Such an agreement limits, to some extent, what fantasy can do; it is, within the terms of this definition, a form of intellectual play that toys with certain possibilities but does not aim to lead the reader into a rich complex of emotional associations. As defined, fantasy is one of the sanest of literary forms and tends to attract, somewhat conservative writers, three of whom Irwin examines in some detail: Tolkien, C. S. Lewis, and Charles Williams.

Irwin's clarity in discussing these and other (too often neglected) fantasists is welcome. He summarizes past arguments on the subject from H. G. Wells to George P. Elliott in some detail. And his examination of rhetoric, though obviously indebted to Wayne Booth, is carefully effective. Limiting himself to "prose fiction fantasy" between 1880 and 1957 in English (he makes an exception with Kafka's "Metamorphosis"), Irwin outlines a genre that is largely the product of English conservatives living in an age of empiricist skepticism. That "fantasy," as Irwin uses the word, is a by-product of this intellectual mode is clear from his crucial use of centering concepts such as "fact," "non-fact," "real world," "impossibility," and "wit." Irwin's perspective, and that of the authors he studies, is one of stabilized narration, the separation being clear between observing self and objects. The unconscious, to this extent, is finessed, and the book's discussion of Freud is abrupt. With works like Kafka's where the "wit" cannot dominate over the disjunction, the analysis lacks resonance, and the discussion of metamorphosis, in light of recent studies on the subject, does not really examine the nature of fear—rhetorically or otherwise—in those texts where metamorphosis occurs. The concluding chapter, which accounts for the "value" of fantasy, grows somewhat ill-tempered at the spectacle of public indifference to the intellectual play of fantasy literature. But apart from these examples of normative prescription, this study makes its seemingly unruly subject into a reasonable and comprehensible one.

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*The Faces of Eve: Women in the Nineteenth-Century American Novel* by Judith Fryer, New York: Oxford University Press, 1976. Pp. 294. \$11.95.

The myth of the New World Garden permeated American life and literature of the nineteenth century, according to Judith Fryer, and although "Adam" has been a stock figure of cultural interpretation, "Eve" has been neglected. *The Faces of Eve* is a study of the fictional images of the New World Eve who, Fryer finds, is a complex, multi-dimensional figure with four discernible faces: the Temptress, the American Princess, the Great Mother, and the New Woman. The first two faces are well known to criticism under different aliases; they are the dark lady and the fair maiden of Leslie Fiedler and others. The Great Mother, an acknowledged borrowing from Erich Neumann, is a face of Eve apparently seen only by Henry James, since the chapter devoted to it focuses exclusively upon his work, and it is here where Fryer offers the most startling and unconvincing readings of texts. Finding mothers everywhere, she even suggests that Mrs. Grose may be the mother of Miles and Flora in "Turn of the Screw," and Mrs. Bread the mother of Claire and Valentin in *The American* (a surprise, no doubt, to Mme de Bellegarde who thinks *she* is their mother). The New Woman—the "free" and "equal" woman—is a caricature sometimes vicious, sometimes sentimental as portrayed by male novelists; only Kate Chopin's Edna Pontellier is found to be a woman, not an image; and Chopin is the only female novelist included in the study.

Indeed, the subtitle is misleading, for the book focuses largely upon women in the works of Hawthorne and especially of James with abbreviated discussions of isolated characters of Melville, Holmes, Frederic, Howells, and Chopin. Fryer adopts an eclectic critical methodology, fusing textual, historical, and biographical approaches, since "this is an analysis...not only of the nineteenth-century American heroine, but of the culture which shaped the perception of the authors whose creation she was, and of the authors themselves, who projected their own images upon their heroines." The culture and the authors themselves, however, are given brief and clearly tangential consideration. The first chapter provides an historical overview of the woman's movement in the nineteenth century and of the role and view of women in edenic communities and utopian schemes. Fryer's analysis of character in the subsequent four chapters is strongest when she worries less about establishing common "faces" for Eve and more about grounding her observations in the specific language of texts (annoyingly quoted without page references). It is weakest when she makes psychoanalytical potshots at the psyches of the authors.

*The Faces of Eve* is noteworthy for its often perceptive, sometimes outrageous discussions of specific characters. But while undoubtedly the myth of the New World Garden was important in nineteenth-century thought, Fryer's "faces of Eve" must be seen finally as an artificial construct which offers no significantly new perspective on women in the nineteenth-century American novel.

JOANNE V. CREIGHTON

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*English Popular Literature 1819-1851* by Louis James. New York: Columbia University Press, 1976. Pp. 368. \$19.95.

As its author suggests, this book's greatest virtue is in its many illustrations. Being able to see the manner in which popular literature originally appeared takes us a long way toward granting it more serious consideration. There are numerous helpful reproductions throughout the book, though they are not always so clear as they might be. One example is the almost impenetrable reproduction of John Martin's illustration for *Paradise Lost*.

Louis James' excellent general introduction is a skillful blending of familiar and new information concerning the various forms of popular literature and their relationship to the events of the times. The anthology section provides numerous samples of this literature, though the selections go well beyond the works mentioned in the introduction. Unfortunately, in order to offer a wide sampling of many kinds and subjects of popular literature, the book is forced to utilize many fragmentary samples, such as short excerpts from novels.

It would have been more convenient for readers to have credits accompany illustrations in the text instead of having them listed at the ends of sections. Despite the few limitations of the book, though, there is no doubt that it is a solid contribution to the study of Victorian culture, for it is the first anthology of its kind and has been assembled with care and clear purpose.

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*Tennyson's Style* by W. David Shaw. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976. Pp. 347. \$12.50.

W. David Shaw has written a thorough and intensive study of Tennyson's poetic style, but his book offers far more than a simple analysis of technical devices, for it presents interpretations of themes and motives in Tennyson's poetry and ventures an analysis of Tennyson's personality and ideas. The examination of Tennyson's use of the infinitive, appositional grammar, figurative language, repetition and other stylistic features, underlies and supports Shaw's evaluations of individual poems. He is particularly strong in his readings of the great monologues, *In Memoriam*, the *Idylls* and the late didactic poems. The treatment of the early poems, *Maud* and the later political poems is less satisfying. Shaw arrives at sound general opinions through his detailed readings. He views Tennyson as a poet of transition between Romantic sensation and Victorian reflection, whose best manner and mood is essentially elegiac, and suggests that while Tennyson sought always for stable forms, he was reluctant to abandon the advantages of multiplicity and suspension; hence his poetry offers many-sided explorations of states of mind rather than clear-cut conclusions.

At times *Tennyson's Style* is difficult reading, especially where detailed technical analyses are concerned, but it is always rewarding. Moreover, Shaw provides a lucid summary of his findings in a concluding chapter that is a



model of its kind. A Bibliographical Essay at the end of the book isolates works that Shaw has found pertinent to his study and reveals his own scholarly preferences.

JOHN R. REED

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*The Woman and the Myth: Margaret Fuller's Life and Writings* by Bell Gale Chevigny. Chicago: The Feminist Press, 1976. Pp. xviii. + 501. \$6.50.

For thirteen years, a portable anthology of Margaret Fuller's works has been needed to complement Perry Miller's 1963 edition, *Margaret Fuller: American Romantic*. Bell Gale Chevigny now offers that needed supplement, following Miller's editorial method of providing lengthy introductions to writings by and about Fuller, but Chevigny's points and perspectives are quite different. She views Fuller, for example, as a woman who was an outstanding but not an atypical example of American womanhood, and her comments on this score are provocative and often brilliant. This thesis, however, sometimes distorts the picture for the reader as when Chevigny suggests that the primary purpose of Fuller's Conversation Classes—whose topics usually were on classical mythology—was "consciousness-raising."

As needed and as attractive as this anthology is (the Press Roman typeset with Caslon and Palatino heads make this an extremely readable edition, though the inexpensive "Perfect binding" might not survive one thorough reading), it supplements and does not supplant Miller's collection. To cite the case most relevant to literary scholars, Chevigny provides only one of the more than two dozen articles Fuller published on American writers, and that one article is the one which is always included by editors. This new anthology, fine as it is, makes one wish for a reliable and complete edition of Margaret Fuller's works.

HENRY GOLEMBA

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*The Stormy Petrel and the Whale: Some Origins of Moby-Dick* by David Jaffé. Baltimore: Port City Press, 1976. Pp. vii + 76 + 13 plates. \$2.50.

Those who enjoyed William Stanton's *The Great United States Exploring Expedition* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975) should delight in David Jaffé's exploration of Herman Melville's use of Charles Wilkes' *Narrative of the United States Exploring Expedition... 1838-1842* (1845) for three main purposes in creating *Moby-Dick*: as a guidebook for geographical details of setting; as a source for character features such as Queequeg's tattoos and Fedallah's turban; and as inspiration for psychological portrayal, the chief of which is "the stormy petrel" himself, Charles Wilkes, who, Jaffé claims, is the model for Ahab not only in physical characteristics but also in temperament as an "able, unconventional, and great" commander with a "certain sickness of soul." Wilkes' cousin, William Magee Seton, the husband of the present St.

Elizabeth Ann and the sufferer of tuberculosis, "a family weakness," was, Jaffé further maintains, the model for Clifford Pyncheon in Nationiel Hawthorne's *House of the Seven Gables* (1851). The picture of the Edward Malbone miniature of Seton would be a useful aide in teaching Hawthorne's novel.

One caution: Jaffé is an admitted amateur. Some of his material needs more thought. If he is right, for example, in saying that Melville combed fourteen pages of scattered references in the *Narrative* to create the one powerful paragraph on Lima (in Chapter XLII, "The Whiteness of the Whale"), then more attention should be paid the question, "Why Lima?" Also, the book sometimes reaches too far and falls that one step from the sublime, as when Jaffé cites a snow hill from the *Narrative's* antarctic illustrations and sees Moby Dick there. But such occasional silliness would not fool cooler heads, and the book has more than enough useful and provocative suggestions to compensate.

HENRY GOLEMBE

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*The Great Feast of Language in Love's Labour's Lost* by William G. Carroll.  
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976. Pp. xii + 279. \$15.00.

*The Ethic of Time: Structures of Experience in Shakespeare* by Wylie Sypher.  
New York: The Seabury Press, 1976. Pp. xi + 216. \$10.95.

Although quite different in design and focus both of these books present peculiarly modern versions of Shakespeare. Professor Carroll argues that *Love's Labour's Lost* is an entirely self-reflexive play about language, poetry and the transformative power of the imagination. He sees the relationship between art and nature, the terms by which the play proceeds, as a continuum whose extremes are mediated by decorum. The argument is largely familiar, grounded in the major critical tradition that has developed in the last twenty years for this play. Because it is basically a New Critical reading of the play, the discussion turns frequently to offering more precise readings of a scene, a theme, a character or a speech. Although there are attempts to contextualize some of the issues of the play, most of the historical criticism that derives from Bradbrook and Yates is repeated unquestioned and unexamined. Predictably the last chapter is devoted to proving that everything in the play is contained in the final songs. Given the methodological assumptions this book begins with, it is a serviceable and creditable reading. The same cannot be said of Professor Sypher's book. In a series of related essays he argues that Shakespeare was concerned with the problematics of time that modern science is now facing. Each chapter begins with a brief review of some such problematic and there follows then a discussion of a play or a group of plays in which Professor Sypher claims Shakespeare has "anticipated" the moderns. The statement of the problems vary from the simplistic to the erroneous and the discussions of the plays offer little that is new or insightful.

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